Authoritative Study on Pipeline Control Contradicts CUSD Analysis

The analysis and conclusion in CUSD's latest pipeline study is perched upon an exceedingly optimistic estimate of the amount of fuel that could flow from a ruptured or leaking pipeline. It is argued that the pipeline would be shutoff, perhaps automatically, in less than five minutes following detection of a leak. Nobody that I’ve contacted believes this to be realistic.

An authoritative source on this subject is the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). In 2005, NTSB issued a study on this very subject. Here is the study abstract:

In the pipeline industry, Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are used to collect data from pipeline sensors in real time and display these data to humans who monitor the data from remote sites and remotely operate pipeline control equipment. This National Transportation Safety Board study was designed to examine how pipeline companies use SCADA systems to monitor and record operating data and to evaluate the role of SCADA systems in leak detection. The number of hazardous liquid accidents investigated by the Safety Board in which leaks went undetected after indications of a leak on the SCADA interface was the impetus for this study.

The full study is quite readable. If you take the time to look it over, you will conclude that the leak estimates in CUSD's latest study are quite unrealistic. Unfortunately, to gain this knowledge, you’ll have to accept “SCADA” into your vocabulary, along with a few other similarly obscure acronyms!

If enough fuel leaks from the nearby segment of pipeline, it will flow to the school, under the school, and it will disrupt the La Pata rescue and evacuation route. There is no physical impediment to prevent fuel from reaching the school site. The NTSB study is filled with examples of leaks that went undetected for an hour or more, and several instances in which pipeline operators restarted pumps after automatic controls had shutdown a pipeline due to an actual leak.

If the technical jargon is just too much to follow, please keep this one fact in mind: Fuel flows through this pipeline at a rate of 4200 gallons per minute (that's $17,640 per minute, at the price I paid this morning)! Read more!

Are You Listening? Why not Speak?

It is wonderful to contribute to the demise of the monopoly on communication that has so long existed with regard to the affairs of the Capistrano Unified School District.

For years, CUSD has offered one truth through its "professional" public relations, "Superintendent's Weekly Update", the newsletters, e-mail distribution lists and the controlled format of Board meetings. Now, the discussion has become more democratic. Hopefully, it can also become more productive.

The Capistrano Dispatch has launched, "Beyond the Blackboard". Yet they are not afraid to point people over here for a narrow source of news regarding CUSD. I'm appreciative!

Another big development is the online presence of Ken Maddox, a new Trustee. Ken's online commentary is a breath of fresh air. Regardless of your view of Ken and his election, we all should applaud his willingness to lay out his viewpoint for all to consider. Checkout his thoughts on the Board meeting scheduled for August 11.

Everyone should join the conversation. After all, it's "public education." Read more!

$150 Million Doesn't Buy Much at CUSD

Last week, CUSD began installation of portable classrooms on its brand-new $150 million high school. With all of the brilliant capacity planning that went into this site, it is now evident that almost half the classrooms on campus were planned to be in so-called "relocatable" buildings.

Whether these buildings are able to provide any margin of safety for the occupants is a question worth asking. Between the fuel pipeline, the storm drains (connected to the drains under these classrooms), the EMF from adjacent 230 KV transmission lines, and god knows what else, there is cause for concern.

Studies conducted for the California Department of Education have shown that portable classrooms are less expensive to install, but cost more to maintain over the long term than permanent structures. Given this fact, can there be any logic in using portable buildings as a permanent fixture of a school?



Pictures Read more!

Pipeline Safety - Human Factors

One factor not considered in the CUSD pipeline risk analysis is the background of the pipeline operator, Kinder Morgan. The K-M people locally have been quite helpful and cooperative with me in my efforts to inform myself. Nevertheless, K-M is a large firm. Operation of any business or a pipeline is merely a human endeavor, subject to human failing. The character and quality of such undertakings is thus subjective, except in situations where the law is broken...

In 2005, K-M plead guilty to multiple felonies and paid millions of dollars in fines in connection with a spill of diesel fuel into the Suisun Marsh in Solono County. The company was placed on three years of probation that has apparently just ended.

You need only read the first two paragraphs of this document to understand what happened:

1. On or about April 27, 2004, at 6:27 p.m. Defendant noticed an abnormal pressure drop in a pipeline owned and operated by Defendant, which lead to the discharge of diesel, a petroleum product, into the waters of the United States in Solano County, California. Defendant shut down the pipeline and began an inspection of the pipeline. On April 28, 2004, at 12:19 p.m., after conducting additional inspections, Defendant began a pressure test of the pipeline by injecting more diesel, or petroleum products, into the pipeline. Defendant stopped pumping at 12:40 p.m. after an aerial crew noticed two areas of discoloration in the Suisun Marsh in Solano County.

2. On April 27, and April 28, 2004, Defendant failed to notify the required authorities of any release or threatened release of diesel into the environment prior to 2: 35 p.m. on April 28, 2004. The People have filed a Complaint against Defendant in the above-captioned action for alleged violations of the Government Code, the Water Code, and the Fish and Game Code resulting from the Defendant’s conduct and alleged failures to act on April 27, and April 28, 2004.

The pipeline involved in this incident is very similar to the pipeline passing by SJHHS.

On July 24, 2007, a K-M pipeline in British Columbia was struck by an excavator and discharged crude oil under high pressure. While K-M does not seem to be at fault in rupturing the pipeline, they did not act promptly to stop the flow of oil.

The video of the accident is interesting. Keep in mind as you view it that the material that is escaping is crude oil. It is pumped under less pressure than distilled fuels, and it is far less likely to catch fire. Had this been a gasoline pipeline, all of the people shown in this video would be in grave danger.



In November 2004, during construction of a water main for the East Bay Municipal Utility District, a backhoe hit a K-M 10-inch high-pressure gasoline pipeline. The explosion killed five men and injured four others.

K-M paid $15 million to resolve criminal and civil charges related the incident (California v. KMGP Services Co., Cal. Super. Ct., Nos. 01-132885-5, N07-1598, 9/21/07). KMPG Services also plead no contest to six felony violations of worker safety regulations under California Labor Code Section 6425. The plea agreement causes the company to be placed on probation for two years and to hire an auditor to evaluate the implementation of pipeline safety procedures required by federal regulators. K-M, its affiliated companies, and insurers have paid over $69 million to victims, families of victims, and other persons claiming injury from the explosion.

Video shot by ABC News several hours after the accident is here:



It is worth noting that this incident occurred next to an occupied high school. No students or staff were in the vicinity of the fire, but school staff were among the first contacted by those fleeing the incident.

The California State Fire Marshal investigated this accident and issued a Final Report that found that:

1. Kinder Morgan did not properly mark the location of the LS-16 petroleum pipeline as required by the company’s damage prevention program and as required by Section 4216 of the California Government Code. Specifically, Kinder Morgan did not mark the approximate location of their pipeline to within 24 inches of either side of the exterior surface of the subsurface location at KM Station 447+90 to Station 448+18 (EBMUD Station ±100+15). This is a violation of CFR 49, Part 195.442(a) which states: “each operator of a buried pipeline must carry out, in accordance with this section, a written program to prevent damage to that pipeline from excavation activities. Period of violation: September 28, 2004 - November 9, 2004 (42 days)

2. Kinder Morgan staff/agents did not follow the company’s line locating procedures. Specifically, Section 4.2 of Chapter 4 in Kinder Morgan’s Maintenance Manual (Line Locating) states: “Prior to beginning any maintenance work or excavation work, the location of the pipeline shall be reviewed by the local Line Rider or other Company representative and verified by drawings and a pipeline locating device.” A Kinder Morgan representative was present on November 2, 2004, and thereafter, to observe benching operations. However, he did not review and verify by the use of drawings and pipeline locating devices that the location of the pipeline was correctly marked.

On July 15, 2004, the U.S. Department of Transportation Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) alleged violations of certain federal regulations in connection with K-M’s pipeline integrity management program, as a result of inspections of facilities in Orange, CA and Doraville, GA. Two years later, K-M, a final order was issued and K-M subsequently sought further clarification of the order. The final outcome of this matter unclear.

On August 26, 2005, the PHMSA issued a corrective action order instructing K-M to make a comprehensive effort to address “integrity threats” along the pipelines of its Pacific Operation which includes the pipeline adjacent to SJHHS. Almost a year later, on April 10, 2006, a consent decree was announced that required K-M to conduct third-party independent review of its operations, and to restructure its internal pipeline inspection programs. This a order will require K-M to spend approximately $50 million over a five year period.

Any operation of the scale of K-M has inevitable problems. It is important to keep them in perspective. Also, regulators like PHMSA exist to regulate and District Attorneys exist to bring lawsuits. These actions bring to light issues that might not otherwise receive public attention and that we can independently assess. Read more!

Outside Review of Revised Pipeline Analysis

Late last week, I forwarded a copy of the draft Pipeline Safety Hazard Assessment to Richard Kuprewicz. He is a pipeline engineer who has worked with the City of Bellingham, WA and with the Pipeline Safety Trust. Mr. Kuprewicz is often quoted on pipeline matters in the press and has extensive experience in this field. You can gain appreciation of his background by simply entering his name in a search engine such as Google.

Mr. Kuprewicz’s comments are reproduced below. In reading this material, keep in mind that he has no first-hand knowledge of the the SJHHS site and his comments are based on his first reading of the July 16 draft. Also, he was not paid for his comments.

I have completed a quick review of the attached draft and have the following general comments which are by no means meant to be limited to all the problems or serious mischaracterization associated in this draft report.

I do not know if it is the pipeline inexperience of the “professional engineer” or the fact that she must follow a “goofed” guideline protocol defined by the CDE risk assessment method that creates a very poor risk assessment concerning transmission pipelines based on the many false technical assumptions or related misinformation that apparently biases the outcome. I’ll let you be the judge on this matter. Some quick general comments.

1) While this report is “stamped” by a professional engineer the fact remains that concerning pipelines there is no such animal as a profession engineering stamp for pipeline engineers. Risk assessment and pipeline design, operation, maintenance, failure dynamics, responses, and siting issues are highly specialized fields and not many companies or government agencies or individuals bring the unique system experience required to qualify to be true experts in this field. A review of the pipeline regulations and pipeline codes will clearly indicate that experience in this area takes precedence. The stamp Is an illusionary safety that the attorneys and insurance companies can neutralize if it had to come to that extreme.

2) The report fails to adequately present or properly discuss the much higher release rate dynamics associated with liquid transmission pipeline rupture of a highly compressed fluid. For a 16 inch pipeline operating at a pressure near 1425 psig you can bet that the release rate will be well beyond 10,000 Bbls/hr until the pump energy and line pack effect dissipate (this can take quite some time). Note that this rate increase release volume, depending on SCADA operation recognition and reaction time, can easily exceed the volume associated with pipeline drain down which brings to question why 5 minutes was chosen for rupture detection and pump shutdown. It is my extensive experience that 5 minutes is a very fast reaction time and no information is provided in the report to verify such an optimistic reaction will occur during a rupture on this pipeline segment. A plot of the amount of tonnage of fuel released over time taking into effect the transient hydraulic effects will make this rupture mass release point. I’ll let you take a guess as to how many microseconds a rupture release will take to blow to the surface and form a very large and turbulent vapor cloud. I am not here to scare folks just to be sure people are making informed decisions based on facts and sound science

3) I’d be real careful about overstating the safety associated with integrity management regulations as many pipeline companies are still on a learning curve. Note also that KM is under a CAO or settlement with PHMSA as a result of numerous pipeline failures that apparently their west coast integrity management program missed.

4) It is unclear whether all the girth welds in the KM pipeline in this area were inspected. Note that federal regulation at the time of this construction (1986?) did not require all girth welds to be inspected. KM could clear this important matter up quickly by stating that they did indeed radiograph all girth welds and ideally still have the records of such important construction inspections. Girth weld failures associated with land or earthquake tend to manifest themselves as rupture releases.

5) It is stated that “The CDE protocol relies on an annual frequency of pipeline failure based on historical data collected from the Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS) Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Accident Database.” There is insufficient evidence to verify that the assumed pipeline failure probability of 1.3 x 10-3 is appropriate for this segment of the KM pipeline. This value/determination is very leveraging to the risk assessment conclusion. There are many problems with the OPS database – one of them being that false or erroneous reports made to this database cannot be corrected by OPS. There are other serious problems with this protocol utilizing history to predict future pipeline operations. Know of any pipeline operator that is still running his pipeline like he was 1 year, 5 years ago, or ten years ago?

6) It is stated in page 7 under ‘Human Error” that “Past pipeline accidents that were caused by third party damage but compounded by human error (e.g., the Bellingham pipeline accident in 1999) resulted ...” This is an error of fact in the report related to Bellingham and underscores more of the problems probably associated with the OPS database. The primary failure initiator for the Bellingham rupture has never been publicly disclosed and I am not permitted to disclose that evidence. I can, however, speak up when others are not being truthful or have mischaracterized the cause of this terrible tragedy. The NTSB report wisely mentions that third party damage “contributed” to the Bellingham failure. Somewhere in this risk assessment report for this KM pipeline I read that they have some remote operated valves that close in one minute – now that gets my attention on a 16 inch liquid pipeline operating close to 6000 Bbls/hr! KM had better have very competent transient pressure hydraulic modeling engineers on this pipeline segment who know what they are doing!

7) One last comment on the assessment’s observation that hydrocarbon vapor mixtures in the open can’t explode. Such poor observations demonstrate very poor experience with hydrocarbon mixture releases and emergency response (such as gasoline) even in the open.

Anyway, I think I have made my point. California may be trying to make progress in school siting around pipelines, but let’s all try to avoid an illusion of safety that poor risk assessment approaches can create. The illusion of safety can cause groups of very smart people to do incredible stupid, even reckless decisions that can drive to serious failures.

In my opinion, comments such as these make it clear that our school Board should not rely on a single opinion regarding the risk of the pipeline. Other experts like Mr. Kuprewicz should be retained on behalf of the Board to raise the appropriate questions and extend Ms. Fitzgerald's analysis to consider practical steps that would mitigate risk to students and staff in the area of the school. Read more!

Pipeline Common Sense

I have been asked for ideas and suggestions for next steps in dealing with the SJHHS pipeline. I will offer a few ideas below, but first, I think it is important that I clear up a few issues that arose in the presentation to the school board on Monday night.

First, here is a brief editorial:

I think it is unconscionable and rude that Messer's Carter and Bergman would request approval of their new analysis without allowing public review of the document. The notion that Trustees would be requested to approve the whole study on the basis of a PowerPoint presentation is troubling. The day when CUSD Trustees would blindly approve whatever is put in front of them has clearly passed. I think this is a significant milestone.

Mr. Bergman’s attempt to persuade Trustees to approve the analysis crossed the line of truth in several places. To cite one example, he stated that CDE had requested that CUSD close the ball field at SJHHS, as if to emphasize the need to send CDE a new analysis “for approval”. The truth is that CDE did not request that the ball field be closed. In fact, it was Mr. Carter that made this decision on his own, in my presence, at a Facilities Subcommittee meeting (Mrs. Bryson was also present).

Apparently, Mr. Carter is capable of thinking on his own when it suits him to do so. CDE weighed-in several days later, saying that they thought the original analysis could be fixed once it was was determined, “...whether the valves were manual or automatic.” They imposed no demands or requirements, nor is CDE in a position to impose such things.

1. What prompted CUSD to do this new analysis?

On May 12, the OC District Attorney wrote a letter to Mr. Carter that, in essence, demanded that CUSD comply with the law. This letter is here. I urge you to read it in its entirety, but the critical paragraph is this last one:

“Accordingly, Capistrano Unified School District should be on notice that it has potentially failed to comply with the site selection standards for the proposed addition to the San Juan Hills High School site on which it plans additional construction of sports facilities for the school. Since inquiry into such matters is granted by statute to the Department of Education, the District Attorney's Office is forwarding the original complaint and the results of our investigation to the California Department of Education for investigation by that department pursuant to Education Code § 17251 (b). As articulated in that section, the Department of Education shall notify the Board of the results of its investigation. It should also be noted that if the Department of Education notifies the District of the results of its investigation prior to the acquisition of the site, Education Code § 17251 (b) requires the Board to discuss the findings of that investigation in a public hearing.”

While this letter discussed the fuel pipeline in considerable detail, the DA is actually discussing a general failure to comply with site selection and improvement regulations. This encompasses many other issues presently before the Board, for example, the fact that CUSD purchased the SJHHS site before having site approval from CDE (the stadium, concession stand, and installation of portable classrooms are all involved).

It seems that the Messer's Carter and Bergman have concluded that performing a second pipeline study will, by itself, resolve the issues raised by the DA and put the whole site selection controversy to rest. What do you think?

2. What about the safety of the pipeline and its proximity to the school?

This is an separate issue that demands careful consideration by the Board. Previous site studies performed by CUSD have completely ignored the presence of the pipeline. This includes the Amended EIR, the original Whispering Hills EIR, the site selection “Opportunity and Constraint Analysis”, and numerous other documents. The original (Wilson) pipeline analysis did discuss the pipeline but was flawed in its approach. It was clearly prepared to satisfy a demand by CDE that it be included in the application for site approval — an application that was submitted after the site was purchased.

Pipeline studies performed according to the CDE protocol are not intended to address the general safety question. Such studies are for making decisions about prospective school sites and new school investment. They provide only tangential support for the decision regarding the safety of an existing school site.

The Trustees have to decide whether the risk imposed by the pipeline is small enough that the school district, acting as would a reasonable person, is prepared to expose 2000 students and employees to the risk for 200 days each year. If the answer to this question is “no”, then additional steps are necessary to reduce the risk to an acceptable level.

3. This subject is so technical. How can we possibly understand it? Who do we trust?

The subject is technical. It is also arcane. Because of the unusual nature of fuel pipelines, there are very few people that actually understand their operation. Still fewer people have good information about how they fail. Dr. Fitzgerald has a wonderful resume and speaks persuasively in support of her conclusions, but her experience is doing studies — not operating fuel pipelines or investigating their failure. All the computer modeling she offers is based on her initial assumptions. Some of these assumptions differ from those of other experts.

Missing completely from Dr. Fitzgerald’s analysis are the human factors that contribute to pipeline failure. Often times, the ill-considered actions of a pipeline operator make worse of a pipeline that has already failed.

To resolve this problem, the CUSD Board should engage an independent pipeline expert, working directly for the Board, who can work with Dr. Fitzgerald to expand the scenarios considered in her study beyond those contained in the CDE site selection protocol. There are numerous areas where this is necessary (e.g., explosive vapor in the atmosphere, risk of asphyxiation, danger to evacuation routes, sustained fire, increased fuel flow due to fluid compressing and “line packing”, to name a few; the list of issues is lengthy. An independent expert would be one who is from the pipeline or petroleum industry, or somebody from an investigative agency such as NTSB.

Beyond this, the study must be expanded to identify the circumstances under which fuel can reach near to the school, instead of excluding these circumstances. Dr. Fitzgerald is not yet thinking in this way. She will not, unless an independent expert is available to question the assumptions and scope of her report.

4. This all sounds like it will take awhile. Is it necessary to close the school?

The work will certainly stretch beyond September 2. However, does not imply a need to close the school. A decision of that type remains for Mr. Carter to exercise his judgment in consultation with Trustees. As discussed above, the original decision to close the ball field was made by Mr. Carter, without consultation with others. He did not consider it necessary to close the school. The 2008 Spring term was allowed to run its course and school ended on schedule.

Frankly, the closure of the ball field was illogical and of no consequence. It did nothing to address the issues contained in the DA’s letter. It did not cure a legal problem that has existed since 2004. Arguably, it did nothing to keep students safe (or safer) than they might otherwise be on that site. Incredibly, while students were excluded from the ball field because of a pipeline more than 1000 feet away, they are allowed to continue using land not owned by CUSD, land that is 150 feet or less from a 238,000 volt electrical transmission line, to play soccer — in flagrant violation of state law.

One can only surmise from this that Mr. Carter intended some strategic or political gain by closing the ball field. He continues to continence violation of the law regarding power line setbacks, he allows students to use private property, and he pays for the maintenance of said private property.

5. Doesn’t operating the school expose students and staff to some risk?

Each day that the school operates, school occupants are exposed to risk. Day-by-day, this risk is very small. I personally have no reservations about visiting the site. However, chronic exposure to these risks is a much different thing. Whether you are worried about the odds of a pipeline failure near the school, or the cumulative effects of exposure to excessive electromagnetic fields, CUSD has the lead responsibility for keeping the public safe from such risks.

6. How can we make this a priority and still get other urgent business done?

I suggest that the whole SJHHS site issue, including the pipeline and the DA's letter, be sent to the Facilities Subcommittee. In that environment, a more collaborative investigation and analysis is possible. In the Subcommittee, a rush to decision can be avoided. However, in referring the matter to the sub-committee, the Board should establish a goal or deadline for having the results brought back before the full Board.

It might also be useful to have one or more workshop activities, including one at SJHHS itself, to engage the public in a discussion and questioning of the experts.

7. Where does this all lead us?

Privately, I have advocated a "risk-informed approach" to SJHHS be adopted, as outlined here:

• Identify hazards and screen for potential impact
• Assess and quantify risk
• Evaluate (see below)
• Mitigate risk where possible
  
• Monitor risks that continue to exist (forever)
  

In a perfect world, we would evaluate whether the present SJHHS site was acceptable for a school --beforehand. However, in this case, the evaluation is constrained by the existence of the school. Naturally, this will have an affect on plans to mitigate and monitor the site hazards over time. Unfortunately, in these circumstances, CUSD will have to do more and the cost of such a perpetual commitment could be considerable.

8. What about the mitigation proposed in Monday’s meeting by Mr. Bergman and Dr. Fitzgerald?

Nobody is in a position to know whether mitigation is necessary — yet. This question remains pending a more thorough analysis of risk. However, it is the position of Dr. Fitzgerald that no mitigation is necessary — she has concluded there is “no risk”.

Nevertheless, Mr. Bergman offered a mitigation that is no mitigation at all. His comment, based on Dr. Fitzgerald’s response to Ken Maddox, was that the pipeline operator would “immediately” contact the Orange County Fire Authority in the event of a pipeline release. The implication was that OCFA would then contact the school district. Mr. Carter then took this opportunity to crow about the “emergency operations center” of the district — an irrelevant comment, but it drew some applause anyway.

This whole conversation was about nothing:

If Kinder Morgan suspects a pipeline release has occurred, they have no immediate way to determine the location of the release. Imagine, they will contact OCFA and say, “We have a possible pipeline release somewhere in Orange or San Diego County.” Is the next step to call SJHHS? Do they call every school district in both counties? In what order to they make these notifications? What does OCFA do with the information?

The answer: everybody waits until a report of “gasoline smell” or a “large fire” is received from the field. Of course, by this time, there is no time or help available to evacuate students away from the risk. Emergency personnel will not rush into an area of an explosive vapor cloud or pooling gasoline, even to evacuate students.

The underlying point here is that any discussion of “emergency response” has nothing to do with mitigation of risk. It is merely a device to shift responsibility for doing something on to others. Once emergency response is necessary, it is too late. Mitigation of risk is not the same as response to emergency.

Trustees should not tolerate more of this sort of nonsense. Read more!