This question is of more than passing interest in our area since the three three major rivers (San Juan Creek, Trabuco Creek and Verdugo Creek) cross the pipeline just upstream from the cities San Juan Capistrano, Capistrano Beach and Dana Point. Portions of Laguna Niguel, and Mission Viejo are also affected.
A pipeline rupture and fuel spill into any of these creeks or their tributaries has the potential to spread disaster over a wide area. In the 1988 Bellingham incident, gasoline flowed more than a mile downstream from the point of pipeline rupture and then ignited.
At locations where the fuel pipeline crosses a river, the normal practice is to bury the pipeline deep below the riverbed. For example, at the San Juan Creek crossing, the pipeline was buried 8 to 15 feet below the riverbed that existed at the time of installation in 1988 (this according to authoritative Kinder-Morgan alignment drawings that I have examined). Of course, seasonal erosion of these natural riverbeds is a consideration. The erosive action of river water and threat to the pipeline are exceedingly small, corresponding to unusual storm flows that are both rare and obvious to the pipeline operator when they occur. Thus, the prospect that a pipeline would rupture through action of a river itself is small.
A larger risk is the potential for a pipeline rupture in areas that drain directly into one of these rivers along the path provided for storm water. Damage from digging, an earthquake, or even a railroad accident can result in release of fuel. A flaw in the pipeline itself, corrosion, and improper operation of the pipeline are other potentials. Fuel that escapes will flow downhill along natural water courses and storm drains into the creeks.
Are our community agencies prepared to respond to a report of fuel flowing in one of these creeks? The Orange County Fire Authority has past experience with one such an event, in 1988 when gasoline spilled from a pipeline and flowed down San Diego Creek in Tustin and Irvine. Fortunately, there was no ignition and the Fire Authority performed well in containing the spill in a sparsely-populated industrial area before it reached the Upper Newport Bay. I am told that two of firefighters were permanently disabled as a result of exposure to gasoline fumes as a result of this incident.
It is noteworthy that this incident occurred in an area that was largely undeveloped at the time. The same incident, if it would occur today, would require that large tracts of homes, movie theaters, medical facilities, multi-floor condominiums and office buildings be evacuated. In 1988, the incident was barely mentioned in the newspaper. Today, it would be a disaster of major proportions, with a significantly greater potential for ignition and loss of life.
If the Fire Authority is prepared, our cities appear to be less so. In fact, they appear to be downright uninformed! For example, my inquires at the City of San Juan Capistrano planning and engineering offices produced blank stares. While SJC has an emergency response plan for a whole variety of events from nuclear accidents to tsunamis, there is no mention of the fuel pipeline. The City of Mission Viejo appears to be no better off. I can find no mention of the pipeline in their disaster response plans.
No city appears to possess the maps that have been created by the pipeline operator, Kinder-Morgan, that describe where fuel would flow in the event of a rupture. The Pipeline and Hazardous Material Safety Administration has designated most of Orange County to be a "High Consequence Area" with regard to this pipeline, yet the cities and the county do not acknowledge this risk.
We can can gain from the experience of others. In this regard, a "lessons learned" presentation by the Bellingham, WA Fire Chief is enlightening. The presentation makes it clear that response to a pipeline incident must be carefully coordinated. It is also outlines the potential that a much greater loss of life might have occurred among those who responded, but for luck and quick reactions of a few who realized that they were dealing with a deadly unknown and pulled-back from the immediate area just before the ignition.
Land Use Planning
CUSD was required to consider the risk to SJHHS because it is subject to provisions of Title 5 in the California Code that regulate school construction adjacent to liquid fuel and natural gas pipelines. But other facilities such as private schools, hospitals, convalescent facilities, pre-schools, etc., can (and are) inappropriately located in areas near dangerous pipelines. The location of these activities are regulated by cities and county through land-use plans. So far as can be determined, no city in our area has incorporated the presence of pipelines into their land-use planning. The county also has nothing.
Responsible land-use planning must incorporate the principal that no facility that houses large numbers of people, or that would require assistance in evacuation should be located in an area or along a path that could be directly threatened by a pipeline rupture. In response to a rupture of a liquid fuel or natural gas pipeline, no assistance in evacuation can be provided in areas that are threatened by gas or vapor clouds, or that are located inside the wider radius of exposure to blast or thermal radiation in the event there is a detonation or fire. People in these areas must be able to move to safety without outside assistance.
All the way back in 1990, following the train wreck and subsequent pipeline disaster in San Bernardino, the National Transportation Safety Board wrote a Safety Recommendation to the Mayor of that city. The letter stated:
Although the City of San Bernardino had developed a general plan for land use, which was the framework for decisions by the City on the use of its land for the protection of residents from natural and man-caused hazards, the use of land in proximity to mainline railroads or high pressure pipelines was not addressed in the general plan or in subsequent revisions to the plan. The Safety Board believes that city and county officials should take into account the location of railroads and high pressure pipelines when developing a general plan for land use.The letter goes on to issue a specific "priority recommendation" that the city make such amendments to its general plan. Almost two decades later, one wonders how this recommendation has been ignored by so many (including the City of San Bernardino). Perhaps the siren song of real estate developers is simply too strong for our local elected leaders?
Back in San Juan Capistrano, we also have to consider a high-pressure natural gas transmission line that runs right through the center of town:
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This Southern California Gas facility enters San Juan Capistrano from the north across the street from J Serra Catholic High School, passes nearby the Saddleback Valley Christian School and the adjacent Silverado Senior Living (Alzheimer's) facility, through the densely populated Villas complex and then into the heart of the historic area. As it continues southbound under Alipaz, it passes 900 feet from Kinoshita Elementary School and Marco Forster Middle School before joining the path of the creek and continuing into Dana Point.
Historically, this facility has been located on "the wrong side of the tracks", so to speak. The areas threatened by it were mostly open space and farmland, with a few exceptions. However, over the past two decades, this area has developed dramatically and all of the aforementioned facilities have been permitted to be built in close proximity to this risk because the land-use plan for the City of San Juan Capistrano is silent.
In 2004, the National Academy of Sciences issued a report that provides considerable guidance to communities: Transmission Pipelines and Land-Use: A Risk-Informed Approach. It is recommended reading for our local leaders.
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