Pipeline Common Sense

I have been asked for ideas and suggestions for next steps in dealing with the SJHHS pipeline. I will offer a few ideas below, but first, I think it is important that I clear up a few issues that arose in the presentation to the school board on Monday night.

First, here is a brief editorial:

I think it is unconscionable and rude that Messer's Carter and Bergman would request approval of their new analysis without allowing public review of the document. The notion that Trustees would be requested to approve the whole study on the basis of a PowerPoint presentation is troubling. The day when CUSD Trustees would blindly approve whatever is put in front of them has clearly passed. I think this is a significant milestone.

Mr. Bergman’s attempt to persuade Trustees to approve the analysis crossed the line of truth in several places. To cite one example, he stated that CDE had requested that CUSD close the ball field at SJHHS, as if to emphasize the need to send CDE a new analysis “for approval”. The truth is that CDE did not request that the ball field be closed. In fact, it was Mr. Carter that made this decision on his own, in my presence, at a Facilities Subcommittee meeting (Mrs. Bryson was also present).

Apparently, Mr. Carter is capable of thinking on his own when it suits him to do so. CDE weighed-in several days later, saying that they thought the original analysis could be fixed once it was was determined, “...whether the valves were manual or automatic.” They imposed no demands or requirements, nor is CDE in a position to impose such things.

1. What prompted CUSD to do this new analysis?

On May 12, the OC District Attorney wrote a letter to Mr. Carter that, in essence, demanded that CUSD comply with the law. This letter is here. I urge you to read it in its entirety, but the critical paragraph is this last one:

“Accordingly, Capistrano Unified School District should be on notice that it has potentially failed to comply with the site selection standards for the proposed addition to the San Juan Hills High School site on which it plans additional construction of sports facilities for the school. Since inquiry into such matters is granted by statute to the Department of Education, the District Attorney's Office is forwarding the original complaint and the results of our investigation to the California Department of Education for investigation by that department pursuant to Education Code § 17251 (b). As articulated in that section, the Department of Education shall notify the Board of the results of its investigation. It should also be noted that if the Department of Education notifies the District of the results of its investigation prior to the acquisition of the site, Education Code § 17251 (b) requires the Board to discuss the findings of that investigation in a public hearing.”

While this letter discussed the fuel pipeline in considerable detail, the DA is actually discussing a general failure to comply with site selection and improvement regulations. This encompasses many other issues presently before the Board, for example, the fact that CUSD purchased the SJHHS site before having site approval from CDE (the stadium, concession stand, and installation of portable classrooms are all involved).

It seems that the Messer's Carter and Bergman have concluded that performing a second pipeline study will, by itself, resolve the issues raised by the DA and put the whole site selection controversy to rest. What do you think?

2. What about the safety of the pipeline and its proximity to the school?

This is an separate issue that demands careful consideration by the Board. Previous site studies performed by CUSD have completely ignored the presence of the pipeline. This includes the Amended EIR, the original Whispering Hills EIR, the site selection “Opportunity and Constraint Analysis”, and numerous other documents. The original (Wilson) pipeline analysis did discuss the pipeline but was flawed in its approach. It was clearly prepared to satisfy a demand by CDE that it be included in the application for site approval — an application that was submitted after the site was purchased.

Pipeline studies performed according to the CDE protocol are not intended to address the general safety question. Such studies are for making decisions about prospective school sites and new school investment. They provide only tangential support for the decision regarding the safety of an existing school site.

The Trustees have to decide whether the risk imposed by the pipeline is small enough that the school district, acting as would a reasonable person, is prepared to expose 2000 students and employees to the risk for 200 days each year. If the answer to this question is “no”, then additional steps are necessary to reduce the risk to an acceptable level.

3. This subject is so technical. How can we possibly understand it? Who do we trust?

The subject is technical. It is also arcane. Because of the unusual nature of fuel pipelines, there are very few people that actually understand their operation. Still fewer people have good information about how they fail. Dr. Fitzgerald has a wonderful resume and speaks persuasively in support of her conclusions, but her experience is doing studies — not operating fuel pipelines or investigating their failure. All the computer modeling she offers is based on her initial assumptions. Some of these assumptions differ from those of other experts.

Missing completely from Dr. Fitzgerald’s analysis are the human factors that contribute to pipeline failure. Often times, the ill-considered actions of a pipeline operator make worse of a pipeline that has already failed.

To resolve this problem, the CUSD Board should engage an independent pipeline expert, working directly for the Board, who can work with Dr. Fitzgerald to expand the scenarios considered in her study beyond those contained in the CDE site selection protocol. There are numerous areas where this is necessary (e.g., explosive vapor in the atmosphere, risk of asphyxiation, danger to evacuation routes, sustained fire, increased fuel flow due to fluid compressing and “line packing”, to name a few; the list of issues is lengthy. An independent expert would be one who is from the pipeline or petroleum industry, or somebody from an investigative agency such as NTSB.

Beyond this, the study must be expanded to identify the circumstances under which fuel can reach near to the school, instead of excluding these circumstances. Dr. Fitzgerald is not yet thinking in this way. She will not, unless an independent expert is available to question the assumptions and scope of her report.

4. This all sounds like it will take awhile. Is it necessary to close the school?

The work will certainly stretch beyond September 2. However, does not imply a need to close the school. A decision of that type remains for Mr. Carter to exercise his judgment in consultation with Trustees. As discussed above, the original decision to close the ball field was made by Mr. Carter, without consultation with others. He did not consider it necessary to close the school. The 2008 Spring term was allowed to run its course and school ended on schedule.

Frankly, the closure of the ball field was illogical and of no consequence. It did nothing to address the issues contained in the DA’s letter. It did not cure a legal problem that has existed since 2004. Arguably, it did nothing to keep students safe (or safer) than they might otherwise be on that site. Incredibly, while students were excluded from the ball field because of a pipeline more than 1000 feet away, they are allowed to continue using land not owned by CUSD, land that is 150 feet or less from a 238,000 volt electrical transmission line, to play soccer — in flagrant violation of state law.

One can only surmise from this that Mr. Carter intended some strategic or political gain by closing the ball field. He continues to continence violation of the law regarding power line setbacks, he allows students to use private property, and he pays for the maintenance of said private property.

5. Doesn’t operating the school expose students and staff to some risk?

Each day that the school operates, school occupants are exposed to risk. Day-by-day, this risk is very small. I personally have no reservations about visiting the site. However, chronic exposure to these risks is a much different thing. Whether you are worried about the odds of a pipeline failure near the school, or the cumulative effects of exposure to excessive electromagnetic fields, CUSD has the lead responsibility for keeping the public safe from such risks.

6. How can we make this a priority and still get other urgent business done?

I suggest that the whole SJHHS site issue, including the pipeline and the DA's letter, be sent to the Facilities Subcommittee. In that environment, a more collaborative investigation and analysis is possible. In the Subcommittee, a rush to decision can be avoided. However, in referring the matter to the sub-committee, the Board should establish a goal or deadline for having the results brought back before the full Board.

It might also be useful to have one or more workshop activities, including one at SJHHS itself, to engage the public in a discussion and questioning of the experts.

7. Where does this all lead us?

Privately, I have advocated a "risk-informed approach" to SJHHS be adopted, as outlined here:

• Identify hazards and screen for potential impact
• Assess and quantify risk
• Evaluate (see below)
• Mitigate risk where possible
  
• Monitor risks that continue to exist (forever)
  

In a perfect world, we would evaluate whether the present SJHHS site was acceptable for a school --beforehand. However, in this case, the evaluation is constrained by the existence of the school. Naturally, this will have an affect on plans to mitigate and monitor the site hazards over time. Unfortunately, in these circumstances, CUSD will have to do more and the cost of such a perpetual commitment could be considerable.

8. What about the mitigation proposed in Monday’s meeting by Mr. Bergman and Dr. Fitzgerald?

Nobody is in a position to know whether mitigation is necessary — yet. This question remains pending a more thorough analysis of risk. However, it is the position of Dr. Fitzgerald that no mitigation is necessary — she has concluded there is “no risk”.

Nevertheless, Mr. Bergman offered a mitigation that is no mitigation at all. His comment, based on Dr. Fitzgerald’s response to Ken Maddox, was that the pipeline operator would “immediately” contact the Orange County Fire Authority in the event of a pipeline release. The implication was that OCFA would then contact the school district. Mr. Carter then took this opportunity to crow about the “emergency operations center” of the district — an irrelevant comment, but it drew some applause anyway.

This whole conversation was about nothing:

If Kinder Morgan suspects a pipeline release has occurred, they have no immediate way to determine the location of the release. Imagine, they will contact OCFA and say, “We have a possible pipeline release somewhere in Orange or San Diego County.” Is the next step to call SJHHS? Do they call every school district in both counties? In what order to they make these notifications? What does OCFA do with the information?

The answer: everybody waits until a report of “gasoline smell” or a “large fire” is received from the field. Of course, by this time, there is no time or help available to evacuate students away from the risk. Emergency personnel will not rush into an area of an explosive vapor cloud or pooling gasoline, even to evacuate students.

The underlying point here is that any discussion of “emergency response” has nothing to do with mitigation of risk. It is merely a device to shift responsibility for doing something on to others. Once emergency response is necessary, it is too late. Mitigation of risk is not the same as response to emergency.

Trustees should not tolerate more of this sort of nonsense.