Pipeline Safety - Human Factors

One factor not considered in the CUSD pipeline risk analysis is the background of the pipeline operator, Kinder Morgan. The K-M people locally have been quite helpful and cooperative with me in my efforts to inform myself. Nevertheless, K-M is a large firm. Operation of any business or a pipeline is merely a human endeavor, subject to human failing. The character and quality of such undertakings is thus subjective, except in situations where the law is broken...

In 2005, K-M plead guilty to multiple felonies and paid millions of dollars in fines in connection with a spill of diesel fuel into the Suisun Marsh in Solono County. The company was placed on three years of probation that has apparently just ended.

You need only read the first two paragraphs of this document to understand what happened:

1. On or about April 27, 2004, at 6:27 p.m. Defendant noticed an abnormal pressure drop in a pipeline owned and operated by Defendant, which lead to the discharge of diesel, a petroleum product, into the waters of the United States in Solano County, California. Defendant shut down the pipeline and began an inspection of the pipeline. On April 28, 2004, at 12:19 p.m., after conducting additional inspections, Defendant began a pressure test of the pipeline by injecting more diesel, or petroleum products, into the pipeline. Defendant stopped pumping at 12:40 p.m. after an aerial crew noticed two areas of discoloration in the Suisun Marsh in Solano County.

2. On April 27, and April 28, 2004, Defendant failed to notify the required authorities of any release or threatened release of diesel into the environment prior to 2: 35 p.m. on April 28, 2004. The People have filed a Complaint against Defendant in the above-captioned action for alleged violations of the Government Code, the Water Code, and the Fish and Game Code resulting from the Defendant’s conduct and alleged failures to act on April 27, and April 28, 2004.

The pipeline involved in this incident is very similar to the pipeline passing by SJHHS.

On July 24, 2007, a K-M pipeline in British Columbia was struck by an excavator and discharged crude oil under high pressure. While K-M does not seem to be at fault in rupturing the pipeline, they did not act promptly to stop the flow of oil.

The video of the accident is interesting. Keep in mind as you view it that the material that is escaping is crude oil. It is pumped under less pressure than distilled fuels, and it is far less likely to catch fire. Had this been a gasoline pipeline, all of the people shown in this video would be in grave danger.



In November 2004, during construction of a water main for the East Bay Municipal Utility District, a backhoe hit a K-M 10-inch high-pressure gasoline pipeline. The explosion killed five men and injured four others.

K-M paid $15 million to resolve criminal and civil charges related the incident (California v. KMGP Services Co., Cal. Super. Ct., Nos. 01-132885-5, N07-1598, 9/21/07). KMPG Services also plead no contest to six felony violations of worker safety regulations under California Labor Code Section 6425. The plea agreement causes the company to be placed on probation for two years and to hire an auditor to evaluate the implementation of pipeline safety procedures required by federal regulators. K-M, its affiliated companies, and insurers have paid over $69 million to victims, families of victims, and other persons claiming injury from the explosion.

Video shot by ABC News several hours after the accident is here:



It is worth noting that this incident occurred next to an occupied high school. No students or staff were in the vicinity of the fire, but school staff were among the first contacted by those fleeing the incident.

The California State Fire Marshal investigated this accident and issued a Final Report that found that:

1. Kinder Morgan did not properly mark the location of the LS-16 petroleum pipeline as required by the company’s damage prevention program and as required by Section 4216 of the California Government Code. Specifically, Kinder Morgan did not mark the approximate location of their pipeline to within 24 inches of either side of the exterior surface of the subsurface location at KM Station 447+90 to Station 448+18 (EBMUD Station ±100+15). This is a violation of CFR 49, Part 195.442(a) which states: “each operator of a buried pipeline must carry out, in accordance with this section, a written program to prevent damage to that pipeline from excavation activities. Period of violation: September 28, 2004 - November 9, 2004 (42 days)

2. Kinder Morgan staff/agents did not follow the company’s line locating procedures. Specifically, Section 4.2 of Chapter 4 in Kinder Morgan’s Maintenance Manual (Line Locating) states: “Prior to beginning any maintenance work or excavation work, the location of the pipeline shall be reviewed by the local Line Rider or other Company representative and verified by drawings and a pipeline locating device.” A Kinder Morgan representative was present on November 2, 2004, and thereafter, to observe benching operations. However, he did not review and verify by the use of drawings and pipeline locating devices that the location of the pipeline was correctly marked.

On July 15, 2004, the U.S. Department of Transportation Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) alleged violations of certain federal regulations in connection with K-M’s pipeline integrity management program, as a result of inspections of facilities in Orange, CA and Doraville, GA. Two years later, K-M, a final order was issued and K-M subsequently sought further clarification of the order. The final outcome of this matter unclear.

On August 26, 2005, the PHMSA issued a corrective action order instructing K-M to make a comprehensive effort to address “integrity threats” along the pipelines of its Pacific Operation which includes the pipeline adjacent to SJHHS. Almost a year later, on April 10, 2006, a consent decree was announced that required K-M to conduct third-party independent review of its operations, and to restructure its internal pipeline inspection programs. This a order will require K-M to spend approximately $50 million over a five year period.

Any operation of the scale of K-M has inevitable problems. It is important to keep them in perspective. Also, regulators like PHMSA exist to regulate and District Attorneys exist to bring lawsuits. These actions bring to light issues that might not otherwise receive public attention and that we can independently assess.